Corrections Policy

How to Report an Error

If you believe we have published a factual error — a wrong figure, date, name or sequence of events — please tell us. Email ramesh.dixit@projectinsiderasia.com with the subject line “Correction”, or use the contact form and select “General Enquiry”.

Please include the URL of the page, the passage you believe is wrong, and — where possible — the source that supports the correction. We can only act on corrections we can verify.

What Happens Next

We acknowledge every correction report within five working days. Verified factual errors are corrected on the page as soon as practicable, and material corrections are noted on the page itself so readers can see what changed and when.

Disagreements about interpretation or opinion are not corrections — but we are always willing to hear them, and they occasionally become the seed of a future investigation.

Corrections Log

5 August 2026 — Sydney Opera House investigation and episode page. Removed an embedded video from the Sydney Opera House investigation and episode pages. The video “Systemic Failure: The Pattern Hiding in Plain Sight” (a series pilot) had been incorrectly presented as the Sydney Opera House documentary. The Sydney documentary remains in production.

5 August 2026 — Six episode pages (NHS IT, Queensland Payroll, Denver Airport baggage, Mars Climate Orbiter, Crossrail, JPMorgan CIO). Removed placeholder publication metadata — dates, durations and view figures — that had been attached to six documentaries still in production. The episode pages now show only verified information alongside the “Documentary in production” status. The homepage YouTube section was also updated: unverified Shorts view counts and a stale video-count claim were removed, and the subscriber figure was updated to the count verified on the channel on 5 August 2026.

2 August 2026 — Boeing 737 MAX investigation and blog. We incorrectly stated that former CEO Dennis Muilenburg “was fired and later indicted”. Muilenburg was never criminally charged; he was forced out in December 2019 and settled an SEC enforcement action in 2022. The only employee criminally charged, chief technical pilot Mark Forkner, was acquitted in 2022. Source: US Department of Justice deferred prosecution agreement (2021); SEC settlement (2022).

2 August 2026 — Boeing 737 MAX pages. We described pilot-retraining costs as “$1 million per airline”. The documented figure is a rebate of about $1 million per aircraft agreed with Southwest Airlines if simulator training became mandatory. Source: House Transportation Committee final report (September 2020).

2 August 2026 — Boeing 737 MAX pages. Direct-crisis-cost figures updated from “$18.7 billion” to “more than $20 billion in direct costs disclosed by Boeing by 2020”, including the $2.5 billion deferred prosecution agreement. Source: Boeing disclosures; DOJ DPA (2021).

2 August 2026 — Boeing 737 MAX pages. Added a current-status section covering the January 2024 Alaska Airlines door-plug incident, the 2024 DOJ finding that Boeing breached its deferred prosecution agreement, the rejected 2024 plea agreement, and the 2025 non-prosecution agreement and November 2025 dismissal of the criminal charge.

2 August 2026 — Crossrail delay blog. We removed a passage stating that former chairman Sir Terry Morgan “admitted” integration problems were known years before public disclosure, and that leadership “hid” failures from sponsors. The page now presents the attributed, contested account: Morgan told the London Assembly that sponsors were warned in July 2018; the Mayor disputed this and accused Crossrail’s leadership of inadequate reporting; the NAO found programme reporting had been over-optimistic. Source: National Audit Office reports; London Assembly hearings.

2 August 2026 — Crossrail investigation and both Crossrail blogs. We incorrectly named Thales as a Crossrail signalling vendor. The pages now describe the documented integration challenge: CBTC in the central tunnels, ETCS on the western section, and legacy signalling on the existing network, all interfacing with the new Bombardier-built trains — integration the NAO found was severely underestimated. Source: NAO, “Crossrail — a progress update”.

2 August 2026 — Crossrail pages. Cost framing corrected: final cost of about £18.8–18.9 billion against a £14.8 billion budget — an overrun of roughly £4 billion driven by delayed completion, extended contractor payments and additional financing (previously framed as a “£4 billion delay cost”). A current-status note was added: the Elizabeth line has been fully operational since May 2023 and is now the UK’s busiest single-operator rail service.

2 August 2026 — Berlin Brandenburg Airport investigation and blog. Removed or softened unsourced specifics (“14 smoke-extraction redesigns”, “€60 million of electrical conduit”, “over 200 design changes”), replacing them with documented accounts: the smoke-extraction system failed acceptance inspection weeks before the planned 2012 opening and was fundamentally redesigned while construction continued; kilometres of incorrectly installed cabling were replaced. Corrected “three German states” to the three shareholders (the states of Berlin and Brandenburg and the federal government), added context on Hartmut Mehdorn’s 2013–14 tenure and Klaus Wowereit’s supervisory-board role, and added a current-status note on BER’s post-2020 recovery and debt-burdened operating company. Source: Berlin parliamentary inquiry reporting.

2 August 2026 — NHS IT investigation and blog. Cost figures corrected: the NAO estimated the programme’s total cost at £12.7 billion; actual spend by its dismantling in 2011 was about £6.4 billion (previously presented as “£12.7 billion spent”). Vendor list corrected (BT, CSC, Fujitsu and Accenture as local service providers, with iSoft supplying the Lorenzo software); “500+ systems replaced simultaneously” reframed as a centrally mandated national rollout across hundreds of trusts. Source: NAO reports on the National Programme for IT.

2 August 2026 — Sydney Opera House investigation and blog. Overrun arithmetic corrected from “1,457% over budget” to roughly 14 times the original A$7 million budget (about 1,400% over); the blog subtitle now uses A$ (not €) and the correct 10-year lateness. Economic-contribution figure corrected to an estimated A$1.2 billion annually for the NSW economy (Deloitte, 2023). The claim that the NSW government “considered cancelling the project three times” was softened to “repeatedly considered abandoning the project”, and Utzon’s February 1966 resignation is now attributed to the NSW government withholding progress payments — a dispute critics described as political pressure.

2 August 2026 — Theranos investigation and blog. Removed the claim that Theranos “signed contracts with the US military” — per the SEC, the military-deployment claim was itself a misrepresentation and the devices were never deployed by the Department of Defense. Walgreens’ $140 million is now described as an investment it sued to recover, settling on confidential terms. Holmes’ sentence is stated as 11 years and 3 months (135 months) with her 2025 appeal loss and August 2032 projected release; Balwani’s sentence corrected from “13 years” to 12 years and 11 months (155 months); $452 million joint restitution noted. Source: SEC; Ninth Circuit (2025).

2 August 2026 — Denver baggage investigation, blog and episode. The $4.8 billion figure — the total construction cost of Denver International Airport — was previously presented as the baggage-system cost. The automated baggage system itself cost roughly $200 million, and its failure delayed the airport’s opening by 16 months, adding an estimated $560 million in delay costs. The blog and episode titles and cost fields have been corrected accordingly.

2 August 2026 — JPMorgan London Whale blog. Softened the claim that “a single copy-paste error cost $6 billion”. Per the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the spreadsheet error understated the desk’s reported risk by roughly half, hiding limit breaches behind positions that ultimately lost $6.2 billion — the error concealed the loss; it did not itself cause the trades.

2 August 2026 — NASA Mars Climate Orbiter blog. Removed an invented passage attributing testimony to “Tom Gavin, the project manager”. The page now reflects the Mishap Investigation Board’s findings: navigation team members flagged anomalous trajectory data during the cruise phase, but the concerns were never formally escalated; a final correction manoeuvre was considered but declined. The spacecraft is described as “believed to have disintegrated in the Martian atmosphere”.

2 August 2026 — Success investigations (Delhi Metro, Hong Kong Airport). E. Sreedharan is now described as “already famous for building the Konkan Railway” (not “restoring”). HKIA’s “politically immovable” opening date now notes it had been moved once already (April to July 1998), and its cargo ranking is dated from 2010, when it became the world’s busiest cargo airport.

Our Commitment

Accuracy matters more to us than being first or being loudest. We would rather correct the record publicly than defend an error privately. If we get it wrong, we will say so — on the record.